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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-TRADE SECRET LAW-IS THE ARKAN-
SAS SUPREME COURT FOLLOWING OTHER JURISDICTIONS DOWN THE
WRONG ROAD IN ANALYZING COMBINATION TRADE SECRETS? Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 66 S.W.3d 620 (2002).
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually all Americans have heard of the famous formula for Coca-
Cola' or the eleven herbs and spices used in Kentucky Fried Chicken
(KFC).2 While these legendary formulas lead to great advertising and pro-
motional trade slogans, trade secret law3 is of great importance to even
small businesses in the United States. 4 The misappropriation 5 of trade se-
crets costs American companies over $100 billion each year.6
The main premise behind trade secret law is that it protects processes,
ideas, lists, devices, or the like from misappropriation by those who have
not put forth the effort to create them on their own.7 The main problem,
however, in the field of trade secret law, despite the large number of judicial
decisions, is the uncertainty in what exactly constitutes a trade secret. 8 Even
1. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289
(D.C. Del. 1985). Even though most of the individual ingredients to the famous formula are
in the public domain, the complete formula for the famous soft drink is probably one of the
best kept trade secrets in the world. Id. Only two people in the company know the formula
for Coca-Cola. Id. The only written copy of the formula is kept in a security vault in Atlanta,
Georgia, and the board of directors have to pass a resolution to open the vault. Id.
2. About KFC, Original Recipe Is Still a Secret, at http://www.kfc.com/about/secret.
htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2002). For years, the famous secret formula was in the head of Colo-
nel Harland Sanders, and the spice list was in his car. Id. Now that the recipe is worth several
million dollars, KFC has it locked away in a safe in Kentucky. Id. There are two companies
that mass produce the recipe, and each has only one part of the total mixture. Id.
3. Trade secret law protects against the improper use or taking of secret information
that provides a competitive advantage to those who do not know or cannot easily obtain the
information. HENRY H. PERRIrr, JR., TRADE SECRETS, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 3-4 (1994);
see also infra Part I1.
4. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search ofiustifica-
tion, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998). "Trade secrets are among the most valuable assets
firms own today, and many courts and commentators believe that the law of trade secrets is
crucial to the protection of intellectual property." Id.
5. Misappropriation is the conduct that one must prove in order to seek damages.
PERRITT, supra note 3, at 4. Misappropriation occurs when a party improperly obtains a trade
secret. Id. at 4-5. Improper conduct includes theft, breach of contract, or breach of a confi-
dential relationship. See id.
6. William G. Porter 11 & Michael C. Griffaton, Identifying and Protecting Employers'
Interests in Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information, 68 DEF. CouNs. J. 439, 439 (2001).
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes Misappropriation of
a Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287, 287 (1990). "The law of trade secrets has developed sporadi-
cally and with little coherence. Words and terms have taken on different meanings at differ-
ent times, causing ambiguous interpretation and little predictability." Id.
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with the long progeny of cases involving trade secrets, two restatements,
and a uniform act, courts and commentators still have difficulty defining a
trade secret.9 The level of difficulty in trade secret jurisprudence escalates
when businesses try to protect combination trade secrets. 1O
This note examines the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc.,11 where the court broke precedent
and held that information must meet all six factors from the first Restate-
ment of Torts12 ("Restatement") as well as the Arkansas Trade Secret Act' s 
3
(ATSA) definition of trade secret.14 First, this note discusses the underlying
facts that led to Wal-Mart Stores's ("Wal-Mart") appeal of the $50 million
jury verdict.15 Next, the note examines the purpose of trade secret law, look-
ing at the delicate balancing act that courts and commentators undertake
between protecting intellectual property rights and limiting restrictions on
trade.' 6 This note then focuses on the various definitions of "trade secret"
that have emerged in the United States, particularly in the area of combina-
tion trade secrets.1 7 With this foundation in place, the note then shifts direc-
tions and examines trade secret jurisprudence in Arkansas, highlighting the
movement of the Arkansas Supreme Court from relying solely on the ATSA
to relying on both the ATSA and the Restatement factors.' 8 Next, this note
analyzes the Arkansas Supreme Court's reasoning in Wal-Mart, including
its decision to heighten the requirements for trade secret protection.19 This
note considers two significant aspects of the Wal-Mart holding, both of
which may have a profound impact on the future of trade secret law in Ar-
kansas.20 First, the author examines the Arkansas Supreme Court's devia-
tion from legislative intent, highlighting that in the two cases following
9. Porter & Griffaton, supra note 6, at 439. "As the Fifth Circuit remarked, what pre-
cisely constitutes a 'trade secret' is 'one of the most elusive and difficult concepts in law to
define."' Id. (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.
1978)); see also infra Part III.B.
10. A combination trade secret is a compilation of elements that are already known in
the industry, but when combined in a unique way, offer a competitive advantage over those
who do not know the combination. Porter & Griffaton, supra note 6, at 442; see also infra
Part III.B.3.
11. 347 Ark. 651, 66 S.W.3d 620 (2002).
12. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. (1939) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See infra
text accompanying note 126 for the six Restatement factors.
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(4)(A)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2001); see also infra Part
1II.C.2.
14. See Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 673, 66 S.W.3d at 635.
15. See infra Part 11.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infa Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
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Wal-Mart, the court has narrowed the protection for trade secrets in Arkan-
sas.2 1 Then, the author discusses the apparent divergence of the Arkansas
Supreme Court from the original focus of trade secret law-protecting the
owner of the trade secret from unfair trade practices.22 Finally, this note
focuses on how this recent divergence will impact trade secret law in Ar-
kansas, suggesting that courts have made it easier for lazier competitors to
gain an advantage by misappropriating trade secrets from those who have
actually put forth the effort in developing the idea.
23
II. FACTS
On February 14, 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc.,24 reversed the jury verdict of $50 million in
favor of the plaintiff, P.O. Market, Inc. ("P.O. Market"), 25 by holding that
P.O. Market did not possess a protectable trade secret.26 On February 15,
2002, newspapers across the nation described how the Arkansas Supreme
Court tossed out the jury's decision because of the lack of evidence that a
trade secret existed.2 7
Sam's Club, a division of Wal-Mart, is a wholesaling warehouse
club.28 Members of Sam's Club are able to purchase bulk quantities of
goods at lower prices than available at regular discount, department, or gro-
cery stores.29 Sam's Club provides goods in bulk for the average consumer
and also for large-scale purchasers.30 In large-scale purchase transactions,
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.
24. 347 Ark. 651, 66 S.W.3d 620 (2002).
25. Id. at 654, 66 S.W.3d at 621. P.O. Market was a Texas Corporation incorporated on
December 4, 1992. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 621. Joe O'Banion incorporated the company with the
help of his brother-in-law, Leonard Hoffman. Id. at 654-55, 66 S.W.3d at 621. P.O. Market
had three shareholders, O'Banion, Hoffman, and Michael McNew. Id. at 655, 66 S.W.3d at
621. P.O. Market never filed taxes, but did have regular business meetings. Id., 66 S.W.3d at
621.
26. Id. at 654, 66 S.W.3d at 621; see also infra Part IV.
27. See, e.g., $50 Million Judgment Against Wal-Mart Reversed, TULSA WORLD, Feb.
15, 2002, at 6; Arkansas Court Reverses Judgment Against Wal-Mart; Texas Company Had
Won $50 Million Award, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Feb. 15, 2002, at 5B; Arkansas
High Court Reverses Decision Against Wal-Mart, BALT. SUN, Feb. 15, 2002, at 2C; Wal-
Mart Wins on Appeal, TIMES UNION, Feb. 15, 2002, at El [hereinafter Wal-Mart Wins].
28. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 655, 66 S.W.3d at 622. Bentonville, Arkansas, is the head-
quarters for Wal-Mart. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
29. See id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
30. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622. Large-scale purchasers usually buy in large quantities such as
truckloads or large freight containers. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622. These purchasers are generally
companies, schools, or governmental offices. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622; Abstract and Brief of
2003]
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Sam's Club stores typically do not handle the individual transactions. 31 In-
stead, the consumer receives the goods directly from the vendor, manufac-
turer, or a Sam's Club distribution center.
32
Prior to 1993 Sam's Club operated its business on a cash-and-carry ba-
sis. 33 Because of the cash-and-carry corporate policy, Sam's Club's mem-
bers could neither use purchase orders to buy goods, nor buy goods on
credit through standard commercial financing plans. 34 Wal-Mart knew that,
without an appropriate financing plan, it was missing out on an opportunity
to serve a large market share of large-scale purchase consumers. 35 Wal-Mart
conducted two studies, one in the mid 1980s and another in 1991, to seek
out alternative credit plans so that it could offer large-scale purchase financ-
ing. Regardless of the alternatives available, there were two main factors
that Wal-Mart disliked about the various credit plans: cost and credit risk.37
Until 1992 Wal-Mart was unable to find a way to extend credit to its large-
scale purchase consumers without incurring exorbitant costs as well as the
credit risk.38 In the summer of 1992, Joseph O'Banion believed he had the
solution for Sam's Club's large-scale purchase financing problem.
39
O'Banion first made contact with the management of Sam's Club
through Dan DeLaughter, a representative of a company called the Service
Appellees at iv, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 665 S.W.3d 620
(2002) (No. 00-1223).
31. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 655, 66 S.W.3d at 622.
32. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
33. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622. Cash-and-carry basis means that Sam's Club did not have a
system for customers to purchase large amounts of goods on credit. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
The reason for this cash-and-carry only policy was largely because the founder of Wal-Mart,
Sam Walton, had a "philosophical aversion" to offering credit to consumers. Id. at 655 n.2.,
66 S.W.3d at 622 n.2. Wal-Mart was slow to implement any credit programs for its custom-
ers because of the beliefs of Sam Walton. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622 n.2.
34. Id. at 655, 66 S.W.3d at 622. The only exception for credit purchases was the Dis-
cover credit card. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622; see also Abstract and Brief of Appellees at iv, Wal-
Mart (No. 00-1223) (stating that Wal-Mart had no way to sell items to multi-billion-dollar
corporate consumers because Sam's Club did not offer any means to buy goods on credit).
35. Abstract and Brief of Appellees at iv, Wal-Mart (No. 00-1223) (estimating that each
Sam's Club Store could reach sales of $1 million a month if it implemented a credit pro-
gram).
36. Id. "Wal-Mart had no ability to make sales from Sam's Club on credit to the multi-
billion corporate and governmental procurement market because Sam's [Club] did not accept
purchase orders or offer standard commercial credit terms." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. "General Electric Capital Corporation ... had offered credit programs to Sam's
[Club], but none were accepted." Id.
39. Id. at 84. "P.O. Market informed Wal-Mart that it had developed a unique and inno-
vative program that Wal-Mart could implement to serve a market that Wal-Mart had been
unsuccessfully attempting to serve for over ten years." Id.
[Vol. 25
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Department. 40 DeLaughter contacted O'Banion in hopes of gaining financ-
ing for a project to sell computers purchased from Sam's Club to the Uni-
versity of Arkansas at Little Rock.41 Even though this plan did not come
into fruition, the negotiations opened the door for O'Banion to submit his
financing idea to Mike Hampson, manager of the Sam's Club in Little
Rock.42 Hampson informed O'Banion that large-scale credit purchases were
virtually unknown to Sam's Club and its customers, and the potential earn-
ings could be quite large.43 After this conversation, O'Banion submitted a
proposal to Hampson to implement a system that would provide credit to
large-scale purchasers for items bought from Sam's Club.44 Hampson
passed the plan on to Sharon Austin, an employee in the Sam's Club export
division.45
In September 1992 O'Banion and Austin made plans to meet in Ben-
tonville, Arkansas, to discuss O'Banion's idea.46 During this conversation,
Austin orally agreed to keep the conversation confidential.47 On October 7,
1992, O'Banion sent a letter to Austin confirming the meeting and renewing
the request for confidentiality.48 This letter outlined the components of the
O'Banion concept. 49 The letter explained that customers would submit a
purchase order to Sam's Club and that P.O. Market would then buy the
goods from Sam's Club at a reduced rate.50 P.O. Market would then take
title to the goods, mark up the price, and ultimately sell the goods to the
consumer on credit. 5' The letter also explained that P.O. Market would ob-
tain a sales force and a marketing program to advertise the large-scale credit
purchasing system to Fortune 500 companies.5 2 P.O. Market also requested
a nonexclusive license to use the logos and trademarks of Sam's Club.5 3
40. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 655, 66 S.W.3d 620, 622
(2002). The Service Department purchased goods from Sam's Club and resold them to cus-
tomers for a small profit. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
41. Id. at 655-56, 66 S.W.3d at 622.
42. Id. at 656, 66 S.W.3d at 622.
43. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622. O'Banion testified that Hampson stated, "bulk credit pur-
chases were a huge untapped market for Sam's Club." Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
44. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
45. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622.
46. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 656, 66 S.W.3d at 622.
47. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 622-23.
48. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 623.
49. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 623.
50. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 623.
51. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 623.
52. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 656, 66 S.W.3d at 623.
53. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 623. The license was extremely important to O'Banion. Id. at 656
n.3, 66 S.W.3d at 623 n.3. O'Banion needed the license to gain financing for his proposal




P.O. Market's financing institute would approve the credit of the companies
prior to any purchases and would keep track of the customer accounts.54
O'Banion stated that his plan offered many favorable aspects to Sam's
Club: (1) the consumers could make purchases for all of their needs with
one large purchase; (2) P.O. Market would assume all of the credit risk;
55
(3) Sam's Club would receive the payment on the same day that the cus-
tomer placed the order; and (4) Sam's Club would increase its market
share56 by reaching the larger consumer wishing to purchase goods on
credit.
57
In early October 1992, O'Banion, Leonard Hoffman, and Michael Hill
met with two employees of Wal-Mart's export division, Austin and Ralph
Bane, to discuss the O'Banion concept.58 Austin informed O'Banion that
she would pass the O'Banion concept on to the legal department and ex-
plained that Sam's Club was not currently seeking any other credit suppliers
for large-scale purchase transactions.59
During November and December of 1992, the parties met twice to dis-
cuss the O'Banion concept. 60 During the December meeting, O'Banion ex-
plained the importance of having the sales agreement signed-without it
O'Banion would not be able to gain financing to begin operations. 6' Austin
informed O'Banion that the legal department was reviewing the license and
sales agreement. 62 Furthermore, Austin explained to O'Banion the concerns
the legal department had with the license and exclusivity aspects of the sales
agreement.63 Even with these glitches, O'Banion believed the parties would
54. Id. at 657, 66 S.W.3d at 623. The financial lender would manage the credit risk and
perform the payment transaction to Sam's Club. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 623.
55. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 623. Although P.O. Market bore the credit risk, O'Banion was not
concerned about the potential risk because the companies he intended to seek out were large
and had substantial amounts of capital. See id., 66 S.W.3d at 623.
56. Abstract and Brief of Appellees at iv, Wal-Mart (No. 00-1223). Sales estimates were
$1 million a month for each Sam's Club store. Id.
57. Id. Sam's Club would guarantee the product just as if the sale had occurred in one of
its stores. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 657, 66 S.W.3d at 623.
58. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 657, 66 S.W.3d at 623-24.
59. Id. at 657-58, 66 S.W.3d at 624. Later, Austin stated that she only remembered
giving the proposal to her immediate supervisor, Scott Burford. Id. at 658, 66 S.W.3d at 624.
During this initial meeting, Hoffman stated the importance of keeping the O'Banion concept
confidential and submitted a confidentiality agreement to Austin. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 624. The
parties, however, never signed the agreement. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 624. According to
O'Banion's testimony at trial, Austin stated that the confidentiality agreement was not neces-
sary and gave her word that the information would be confidential. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 624.
60. See id., 66 S.W.3d at 624.
61. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 624-25.
62. Id. at 658-59, 66 S.W.3d at 624.
63. Id. at 659, 66 S.W.3d at 624. Sam's Club did not grant P.O. Market a license to use
the Sam's Club logos and trademarks. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 624. The problem with the exclusiv-
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sign it "any day." 64 After the meeting, O'Banion changed the terms of the
sales agreement by eliminating the license agreements.65 The parties never
signed this agreement.66
A fourth meeting occurred on January 7, 1993, and, according to
O'Banion, Austin assured him that Wal-Mart would sign the sales agree-
ment soon.67 During this meeting, Austin also mentioned a possible new
aspect of the plan, a credit plan for large-scale customers in Mexico.68 Aus-
tin proposed that P.O. Market set up a financing system for the Mexican
large-scale purchasers. 69 O'Banion informed Austin he was willing to take
the higher credit risk of these customers if it would result in Sam's Club
signing the sales agreement.70 As a result of these meetings, Hoffman
drafted a proposal for adding the Mexican consumers to the original plan.
71
During this time, O'Banion regularly called Austin to check on the
status of the proposal.72 In January 1993, however, Austin quit returning
O'Banion's phone calls.73 Hoffman, concerned the agreement was not going
to happen, sent four additional drafts of the sales agreement along with a
letter stating that P.O. Market could not move forward until it was signed.74
Throughout November and December 1992 and even up to January
1993, O'Banion sought out eight possible lenders for his concept.
75
ity clause was that Sam's Club already had an existing credit program with Discover Card.
Id., 66 S.W.3d at 624.
64. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 659, 66 S.W.3d at 624.
65. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. This third version of the agreement was included with a letter
dated December 15, 1992. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. O'Banion followed up on the letter with a
phone call to Austin. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. O'Banion stated that Austin claimed that she had
sent the new agreement to the legal department. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. At trial Austin denied
forwarding the sales agreement to the legal department. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
66. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
67. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
68. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. Customers of Sam's Club were purchasing items in bulk in
the United States and then marking up the price and selling the items in Mexico. Id., 66
S.W.3d at 625. The Sam's Club stores along the border were accepting letters of credit for
these purchases. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
69. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. The individual stores along the border offered the letters of
credit to its customers, not Sam's Club. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. These consumers were a high
credit risk, and the individual stores were losing money. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
70. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 660, 66 S.W.3d at 625.
71. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. Hoffman also hoped that this would prompt Wal-Mart to sign
the sales agreement. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
72. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
73. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
74. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
75. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625. Several lenders rejected O'Banion's proposal. Id., 66 S.W.3d
at 625. When communicating with each of the lenders, O'Banion presented a copy of his
proposal and a confidentiality agreement. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
2003]
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O'Banion finally decided on NationsBank.76 O'Banion sent a letter to Aus-
tin in March stressing that the bank wanted to meet with all the parties, in-
cluding Sam's Club's financial officers and that a meeting had been tenta-
tively scheduled for March 22, 1993. 7 The meeting never occurred, and in
March 1993, O'Banion, realizing that the proposal was not going to become
78a reality, went back to work at Southwest Factors. During the next several
months, O'Banion had no contact with Austin or anyone else from Sam's
Club.79
However, unbeknownst to O'Banion, during November and December
1992, Wal-Mart was meeting with General Electric Capital Corporation
(GECC) about developing a bulk purchasing credit plan. ° GECC had been
working with Wal-Mart for some time seeking to create such a plan.81 In
late 1992 and early 1993, Wal-Mart finally agreed to a five-year exclusive
agreement with GECC to implement a bulk purchase financing system.82
The GECC program, called Sam's Club Direct, would allow Sam's Club
customers to buy goods from Sam's Club on a credit card issued by GECC,
and then GECC would purchase the accounts receivable from Sam's Club
for the full price. 83 Under this plan GECC never took title of the goods,
unlike the O'Banion concept. 84 In February 1993 Wal-Mart and GECC
signed confidentiality and exclusive trade agreements, and the program be-
came operational in November 1993.85
76. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 660, 66 S.W.3d at 625. Bill McBrine helped O'Banion gain
financing at NationsBank. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
77. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625.
78. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 625-26. Before the existence of P.O. Market, O'Banion and
McNew were principals in Southwest Factors. Id. at 655, 66 S.W.3d at 622. Southwest Fac-
tors offered credit to subcontractors by purchasing their accounts receivable. Id., 66 S.W.3d
at 622.
79. Id. at 661, 66 S.W.3d at 626.
80. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626.
81. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626.
82. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 661, 66 S.W.3d at 626.
83. Id. at 662, 66 S.W.3d at 626. A Wal-Mart interoffice memo dated February 10,
1993, stated in part:
I appreciate everyone's input and time spent reviewing the information on the
proposed credit program for Sam's [Club]. We will be pulling together the team
to continue the review/examination process and communicating that immedi-
ately. In addition, please remember that this is a new product in this industry,
and therefore, confidentiality is a must if we are to maintain our competitive ad-
vantage.
Abstract and Brief of Appellees at 83, Wal-Mart (No. 00-1223).
84. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 662, 66 S.W.3d at 626-27 (providing that instead of GECC
taking title of the goods, the title passed directly from Sam's Club to the consumer).
85. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 627. The appellants contended that this program was not new in
the industry but was already in use by other business. Supplemental Abstract and Substituted
Brief of Appellant at 286, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 665
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In November 1993 O'Banion learned of an article in the Wall Street
Journal detailing Sam's Club's new plan to offer bulk purchase financing.86
After reading the article, O'Banion tried to contact Austin, but was unable
to reach her.87 O'Banion did speak with Austin about what had occurred
later in November and in April 1994.88 In these taped conversations, 89 Aus-
tin revealed that O'Banion had "made it easy for them" to use his plan and
that she felt that Wal-Mart had "stepped on" him.90 Austin also informed
O'Banion that she was not sure whom at Wal-Mart actually saw the
O'Banion concept.91
After talking with Austin, P.O. Market filed suit against Wal-Mart in
Pulaski County Circuit Court for trade secret misappropriation. 92 P.O. Mar-
ket later nonsuited that cause of action, and on April 9, 1999, P.O. Market
filed suit in Miller County.93 P.O. Market stated six causes of action, includ-
ing misappropriation of a trade secret.94 Wal-Mart answered and filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment claiming that the O'Banion concept was not a
trade secret. 95 The trial judge rejected the motion, and in March of 2000, the
case went to trial.96 After a ten-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for P.O.
Market and awarded $6,736,761 in lost profits and $25 million for unjust
enrichment. 97 The trial court also awarded P.O. Market $5 million in attor-
neys' fees and $1125 in costs.98 With interest added, the total judgment was
approximately $50 million.99 Wal-Mart appealed the judgment to the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court, stating in part that the O'Banion concept was not a
trade secret. 100
S.W.3d 620 (2002) (No. 00-1223). A plan similar to Sam's Club Direct had already been in
use at Home Depot and Payless Cashways prior to 1992, but the trial court excluded this
evidence from the jury. Id.
86. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 661, 66 S.W.3d at 626.
87. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626.
88. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626.
89. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626. O'Banion admitted that he taped the conversations without
Austin's knowledge in anticipation of the lawsuit that he had already decided to file against
Wal-Mart. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626.
90. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626.
91. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 626.
92. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 662, 66 S.W.3d at 627.
93. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 627.
94. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 627. The six causes of actions were: "breach of implied contract,
breach of a confidential agreement, breach of confidential relations, misappropriation of a
trade secret, unjust enrichment, and negligence." Id., 66 S.W.3d at 627.
95. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 627.
96. Id. at 664, 66 S.W.3d at 627.
97. Id. at 654, 664, 66 S.W.3d at 621, 628.
98. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 664, 66 S.W.3d at 628.
99. Wal-Mart Wins, supra note 27, at El.
100. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 654, 66 S.W.3d at 621. Wal-Mart had four points for appeal:




For over a thousand years people wishing to seek a competitive advan-
tage from their competitors have used improper means, such as theft, espio-
nage,1° ' or abuse of a confidential relationship, to obtain secret processes,
ideas, or devices. 10 2 Modem trade secret jurisprudence, however, has
evolved into an in-depth analysis on whether the thing in question is a trade
secret. 0 3 The issue of whether or not the thing is a trade secret becomes
even more difficult today because businesses are trying to protect computer
programs, business plans, and marketing plans. °4 The problem with gaining
protection for these combination trade secrets is that each of them may be
composed of components that are generally known or easily ascertainable in
the industry, thus failing one of the key tests for trade secrets in modem
jurisprudence. 105
This section begins by studying the purpose underlying trade secret
law. Next, this section examines the various definitions of a trade secret,
examining both the Restatement definition and the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (UTSA) definition, followed by a discussion on the area of combination
trade secrets. Then, this section will shift directions and focus on trade se-
cret jurisprudence in Arkansas.
A. The Purpose of Trade Secret Law
Trade secret jurisprudence in the United States began around the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century. 10 6 Historically, patent and copyright law pro-
tion; (3) the trial court erred in various evidentiary rulings and in instructing the jury; and (4)
the judgment improperly permitted double recovery of damages." Id., 66 S.W.3d at 621. The
Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the decision on the first issue and did not consider any of
the other issues on appeal. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 621.
101. See E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir.
1970). During construction of DuPont's plant, a competitor flew over the plant and took
pictures to discover the secret process and machine design used by DuPont. Id.
102. Robert C. Van Arnam, Comment, Business War: Economic Espionage in the United
States and the European Union and the Need for Greater Trade Secret Protection, 27 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 95, 97 (2001). "Over 1,500 [sic] years ago a Chinese princess hid
silkworms in her hat and provided them to a man in India, thus revealing the secret of silk
making to a foreign government." Id.
103. See infra Part III.B.3.
104. See Frank J. Cavico, Business Plans and Strategies as Legally Protected Trade
Secrets: Florida and National Perspectives, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1, 57 (2001).
105. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
106. See Bone, supra note 4, at 247 (commenting that the early beginnings of trade secret
law developed from case law and that the 1939 Restatement approach clarified the law and
became very popular in courts across the country); see also PERRITT, supra note 3, at 16




tected the bulk of intellectual property, while trade secret law protected in-
ventions and innovations that were not worthy of such protection. °7 While
the United States has a federal law protecting trademark, copyrights, and
patents, there is no federal law governing trade secrets.'0 8 Instead, the com-
mon law has developed the standards, definitions, and requirements for
trade secret protection.'0 9
The protection under trade secret law extends beyond the realm of pat-
ent law by giving the holder of the trade secret perpetual protection, so long
as the information remains a secret." 0 Moreover, trade secrets do not have
to meet the stringent requirements of novelty, usefulness, and nonobvious-
ness to qualify for protection, unlike patents."' The writers of the Restate-
ment made it explicitly clear in the comments that trade secret law was not
the same as patent protection." 2 Trade secret law does not protect or reward
the invention or discovery of secret processes or devices." 3 The commenta-
tors of the Restatement appeared more concerned with preventing others
who were gaining a competitive advantage from misappropriating trade
secrets through improper means, rather than protecting the actual trade se-
cret. 4 More recently, the writers of the UTSA stated that the general policy
behind trade secret law is to maintain a standard of ethics in the commercial
107. Van Arnam, supra note 102, at 100-01.
108. Hilton, supra note 8, at 287.
109. Douglas F. Halijan, The Past, Present, and Future of Trade Secret Law in Tennes-
see: A Practitioner's Guide Following the Enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 32
U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2001). It is important to note that the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000), does provide for criminal penalties at the federal
level for misappropriation of trade secrets, but neither preempts state law action, nor pro-
vides for a private cause of action. Halijan, supra, at 8 n.23.
110. Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States'
Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 49 & nn. 1-2 (1990).
111. Thomas F. Cotter, Conflicting Interests in Trade Secrets, 48 FLA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1996); see Mimi C. Goller, Is a Padlock Better Than a Patent? Trade Secret vs. Patents, 71
Wis. LAW. 20, 20-25 (1998) (comparing the advantages of patent and trade secret protec-
tion).
. 112. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 757 cmt. b ("A trade secret may be a device or
process which is patentable: but it need not be that. It may be [an idea], which is clearly
anticipated in the prior art or ... merely a mechanical improvement that a good mechanic
can make. Novelty and invention are not requisite for a trade secret as they are for patenabil-
ity."); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 472-75 (1974) (holding that
patent law did not preempt state trade secret law).
113. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 757 cmt. b. Rather, the protection of trade secrets is
against people using reprehensible means, such as theft or breach of a confidential relation-
ship, to gain knowledge and use of the trade secret. Id.
114. Id. § 757 cmt. a ("The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded
only by a general duty of good faith and that liability rests upon breach of this duty; that is,




world. 1 5 As one commentator noted, the purpose of trade secret law is to
maintain fair and clean competition in business.
16
B. What Is a Trade Secret?
The early common law protected an inventor or discoverer from a third
person's theft or misappropriation of a secret process or device. 17 The
common law definition of a trade secret is "(1) information that is used in
business, (2) that is secret, and (3) that gives a competitive advantage to the
person with knowledge of it."' 18 No trade secret protection exists when one
discovers the trade secret by independent discovery, reverse engineering, or
use pursuant to a license or contract. 19 Thus, trade secret law focuses on
two main points. First, there must be a secret to protect, and second, the
protection only applies to the improper taking or use of the trade secret.
120
From this early recognition of a trade secret, the law has developed into a
large body of jurisprudence.1
21
1. The Restatement of Tort's Definition of Trade Secret
In 1939 the Restatement attempted to compile all of the common law
from across the nation and form a general guideline for trade secrets protec-
tion.122 Under the Restatement, a trade secret may consist of a "formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information" or "formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a
pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers."' 23 The alleged
trade secret, however, had to provide the owner "an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it" and had to be in
continuous use in the business. 1
24
115. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1995), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (citing
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 470).
116. Hilton, supra note 8, at 297.
117. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868).
118. PERRITT, supra note 3, at 3-4.
119. Id. at 6.
120. See Lars S. Smith, Trade Secret in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40
IDEA 549, 552 (2000). Courts scrutinize the relationship between the parties when analyzing
trade secret cases. See id. When a party improperly obtains secret information, then trade
secret law steps in and protects the owner of the trade secret, but if the party gains the infor-
mation through proper means, then he faces no liability. Id. Therefore, reverse engineering
and independent discovery are not improper means under trade secret law. Id.
121. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
122. See Cavico, supra note 104, at 6.




The commentators realized that an exact definition of a trade secret
was impossible, so they provided six factors for guidance in determining
whether the information constituted a trade secret. 125 The six Restatement
factors include:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken
by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of
the information to him and his competitors; (5) the amount of ef-
fort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6)
the ease or difficulty with which the information could be prop-
erly acquired or duplicated by others. 1
26
Commentators believe that the Restatement factors should "serve as
the backbone for judicial analysis of trade secret claims."' 27 The main prob-
lem with the Restatement factors is that courts interpret each of the factors
differently, sometimes giving varying levels of importance to each one.'
28
Regardless of the inconsistent application of the Restatement factors, the
factors still play an active role in determining whether the information is a
trade secret. 1
29
2. Uniform Trade Secrets Act's Definition of Trade Secret
Prior to the existence of the UTSA, 130 the common law protection of
trade secrets was at best uncertain.131 Even with the Restatement as a guide,
the common law of trade secret protection was uneven and uncertainty ex-




127. See, e.g., Judge Richard Posner, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit
Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REv. 461, 463 (1992).
128. See Cavico, supra note 104, at 7-8.
129. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
130. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1995), 14 U.L.A. 433-67 (1990).
"The [UTSA] codifies the basic principles of common law trade secret protection ..... Id. at
434.
131. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 434 (1990). "Notwithstanding
the commercial importance of trade secret law to interstate business, the law has not devel-
oped satisfactorily." Id.
132. Id. Despite the need for clarity and uniformity in the area of trade secret protection,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts did not include a revision to section 757. Id. at 435. In-
stead, the American Law Institute decided to include an updated version of trade secret law
in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
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In 1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the UTSA in hopes of clarifying and updating the law of
trade secrets. 133 The UTSA attempted to compile all of the common law
principles into a single body of law, while at the same time elucidating the
various interpretations of judicial decisions.' 34 The definition of a trade se-
cret under the UTSA, however, is a "reasonable departure from the [Re-
statement] ... definition." 135 The writers of the UTSA expanded the defini-
tion of a trade secret beyond the boundaries that the common law had pro-
vided by extending the definition to a plaintiff who has not used the pro-
posed trade secret in business. 136 The UTSA also broadened trade secret
protection by including in the definition not only information that provides a
competitive advantage from its use, but also information that shows that an
idea, process, or device will not work.
137
Section one of the UTSA provides the basis for trade secret law. 138 The
UTSA defines a trade secret as:
information including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that derives independent
economic value actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclo-
sure or use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
1 39
The writers of the UTSA also intended to clarify the "generally known
and easily ascertainable requirement" by stating that this requirement does
not apply to the public at large; it only applies to those who can obtain a
competitive or economic advantage from knowing the information. 40 If
those who can gain some economic benefit already know the information,
then there is no trade secret to protect. 141 The UTSA also stated that infor-
mation is readily ascertainable if it is available in published trade journals,
books, pamphlets, or brochures. 
142
133. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, historical note, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990).
134. See supra note 128 and accompanying text; see also Samuels & Johnson, supra note
110, at 53.
135. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1995), 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990).
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Samuels & Johnson, supra note 110, at 55, 63.
138. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1995), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990) (defining
improper means, misappropriation, person, and trade secret).
139. Id.





The adoption of the UTSA definition by individual states was slow, but
once the American Bar Association approved it in 1979 as a model for trade
secret analysis, more states began adopting the UTSA. 143 To date more than
forty-three states have adopted all or part of the UTSA. 144 There is some
controversy in UTSA states as to whether the Restatement should still play a
role in analyzing trade secret cases. 145
3. Combination Trade Secrets
Combination trade secrets are protectable under both the UTSA and
the Restatement.146 Courts across the country have come to the conclusion
that trade secret protection exists for patterns, processes, or devices that
consist of generally known components, so long as the end product is not
generally known. 1
47
In cases involving combination trade secrets, the courts commonly fo-
cus on two issues in particular, what exactly is the information that the
plaintiff is trying to protect and whether the otherwise commonly known
components are brought together in a unique way to thrust the combination
into trade secret protection. 148 In these cases, there are competing policy
arguments. Primarily, the law of trade secrets seeks to prevent the confiden-
tial disclosures of valuable information, but there is no protection against
independent discovery. 149 Hence, the problem in combination trade secrets
143. Hilton, supra note 8, at 288.
144. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, table of jurisdictions, 14 U.L.A. 182 (Supp. 2002).
Arkansas adopted the UTSA on March 12, 1981. See infra Part III.C.2.
145. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 918 (Ind. 1993) (quoting Optic
Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 585 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)) ("Although all of the
Restatement's factors no longer are required to find a trade secret, those factors still provide
helpful guidance to determine whether the information in a given case constitutes 'trade
secrets' within the definition of the statute."); cf Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting &
Packing, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 110, 114 (Va. 1990) (commenting that once states adopt the
UTSA, their reliance on common law principles was misplaced). "Once the legislature has
acted, the role of the judiciary 'is the narrow one of determining what [the legislature] meant
by the words it used in the statute."' Dionne, 397 S.E.2d at 114 (quoting Diamond v. Chak-
rabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980)).
146. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 757 cmt. b (using the term "compilation" as
part of the information that the Restatement protects); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1
(amended 1995), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990) (using the term "compilation" as part of the in-
formation that the UTSA protects).
147. See, e.g., Saforo & Assocs., Inc. v. Porocel Corp., 337 Ark. 553, 560, 991 S.W.2d
117, 121 (1999) ("It is a combination of components, each of which by itself is in the public
domain, but the unified process has afforded a competitive advantage."); Weston v. Buckley,
677 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ind. App. 1997) (stating combination of known elements must be
unique and not known in the market).




is that the components are generally known but the whole of the thing is not,
and thus it is hard to prove that the person did not obtain the trade secret
from independent discovery rather than improper disclosure.15
0
Regardless of whether the court is using a form of the UTSA or the Re-
statement factors for analyzing the existence of a trade secret, the following
requirements are needed to obtain protection for combination trade secrets:
(a) definiteness of the secret; (b) novelty;
15 1 and (c) security. 52
a. Definiteness of the trade secret
Failing to define a trade secret clearly and specifically can result in the
court's refusal to protect the information regardless of how improperly the
person obtained the information. 53 The owner of the alleged trade secret
must state in definite terms what exactly he or she is seeking to protect.'
54
b. Novelty
Novelty for trade secret protection is not the same as the novelty
needed for a patent.155 However, some element of novelty or uniqueness is
150. Id.
151. See infra Part III.B.3.b. Novelty includes the elements of (i) generally known and
(ii) easily ascertainable.
152. See infra Part III.B.3.c.
153. Julie A. Henderson, Comment, The Specifically Defined Trade Secret: An Approach
to Protection, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 537, 557 (1987). Failure to properly define the trade
secret can result in disclosure because employees may not know what information the em-
ployer wants to keep secret. Id. at 556. Without a properly defined trade secret, the court may
not be able to employ a proper injunction to forbid some uses of the trade secret. Id. The
most dangerous situation is when the court determines that by failing to define the trade
secret, the owner did not take reasonable steps to guard its secrecy; thus no trade secret pro-
tection exists. Id.
154. Weins v. Sporleder, 569 N.W.2d 16, 18 (S.D. 1997). In Weins, the court failed to
find a trade secret existed because the plaintiff never precisely identified what information
constituted or comprised the alleged trade secret. Id. at 20. The plaintiff called the alleged
trade secret "feed product, and its use and application," "selling and developing of the feed
product," "idea," "invention," "tub feed product containing a combination of ingredients to
be fed free choice," "selling and developing the feed product," and "feeding system." Id.; see
also Coenco, Inc. v. Coenco Sales, Inc. 940 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 1991) (determining
that the machine used to control the climate in chicken houses was not a trade secret because
the Eighth Circuit was not sure what specific trade secret was at issue in the case); Electro-
Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983) (holding that
dimensions of a brushless motor lacked specificity and therefore were not a trade secret). See
generally Henderson, supra note 153, at 537-57 (discussing how to specifically define a
trade secret).
155. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 899.
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required, otherwise, the information is generally known or easily ascertain-
able. 156
i. Generally known element
Most trade secret cases fail because the court determines that the in-
formation was generally known. 157 However, courts vary as to what "gener-
ally known" means.'58 Courts typically rely on the obviousness of the se-
cret. "'59 Using the obviousness test, courts reason that trade secret protection
does not exist if the new process, advancement, or device would be obvious
to anyone in that field.160 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, in Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises,16 1 denied
protection for a computer program that utilized twelve triggers to generate a
list for reminder letters. 62 Other businesses were only using two triggers,
vehicle identification numbers and driver's license numbers. 163 The court
reasoned that this was an obvious solution to those in the business of send-
ing reminder letters and that because the system of using more than one or
two triggers was obvious, it was generally known.'
64
ii. Easily ascertainable requirement
To determine if information is readily ascertainable, some courts look
at the time, effort, and cost required to duplicate the alleged trade secret by
proper means.1 65 If information is easily accessible to competitors, then a
presumption arises that the plaintiff claiming the trade secret did not spend a
great deal of time or effort in developing the alleged trade secret. 166 Courts
156. Id.
157. See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
159. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
160. Computer Care v. Serv. Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 1992). In Ser-
vice Centers of Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (111. App. Ct. 1989), the
court reasoned that information in a survey was already known in the industry and the ques-
tions were obvious to anyone in the field as pertinent questions. Conversely, in Dickennan
Associates, Inc. v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co., 594 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Mass. 1984), the court
reasoned that the processes were trade secrets because they were not obvious or easily dupli-
cated.
161. 982 F.2d at 1063.
162. Id. at 1073.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Weston v. Buckley, 677 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ind. App. 1997) (finding that the in-
formation was not easily ascertainable because the plaintiff had spent a great deal of time,
expense, and effort to develop the process).
166. Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Cleveland Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (E.D. Ark.
1994) (reasoning that because there was little effort in developing the information, then no
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have taken the position that if a competitor can easily see or observe a fea-
ture of a product, then it is not a trade secret because it was easily ascertain-
able.167 Courts have also determined that information is easily ascertainable
if it is available from a published source.
168
c. Security requirement
Courts often view the secrecy requirement as the most important factor
in deciding whether a trade secret exists.' 69 Courts look to see if the owner
employed adequate measures to protect the alleged trade secret. 70 In Cardi-
nal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc.,171 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court determined that the security measures used by J.B.
Hunt were reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of the combination trade
secret. 72 The court concluded that the information was not generally known
or easily ascertainable because J.B. Hunt used a number of steps to guard
the secrecy of the information, such as employee confidentiality agree-
ments, passwords and pass codes, and a policy called "loose-lips."',
73
Conversely, in ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the Arkansas Su-
preme Court found that the profit margins and marketing strategies were not
trade secrets because Tyson had failed to maintain secrecy of the trade se-
crets. 75 The court reasoned that "failure of a business to protect against the
disclosure of information it considers to be secret following employment is
injury could result if someone else used the same information-because they too could have
easily discovered it).
167. See, e.g., Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1979).
168. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I cmt. (amended 1995), 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990).
169. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
170. Compare Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 693-94 (D. Minn.
1986) (holding that securing documents in locked files and only distributing them on a need-
to-know basis was sufficient), af'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987), and Johns-Manville Corp.
v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 1034, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (finding adequate
secrecy because the owner used physical barriers, visitor control systems, secrecy agree-
ments, and restricted access to the plant), and Bertotti v. C.E. Shepherd Co., 752 S.W.2d
648, 651 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (determining secrecy was adequate because the owner used
employment agreements, visitor confidentiality agreements, and had shredded documents
before discarding them), with Gordon Employment, Inc. v. Jewell, 356 N.W.2d 738, 741
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding no trade secret existed because the files were not locked and
there was not a confidentiality policy).
171. 336 Ark. 143, 987 S.W.2d 642 (1999).
172. Id. at 151, 987 S.W.2d at 646. The information was pricing models, profit margins,
market strategies, and future plans of the company. Id, 987 S.W.2d at 646.
173. Id, 987 S.W.2d at 646. The "loose-lips" policy only allowed two appointed em-
ployees to speak to the media. Id, 987 S.W.2d at 646.
174. 342 Ark. 672, 30 S.W.3d 725 (2000).
175. Id. at 679, 30 S.W.3d at 730.
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critical to our analysis and the ultimate decision regarding whether the in-
formation is in fact a trade secret."'
176
The owner of the trade secret does not need to provide absolute se-
crecy, but some element of secrecy has to exist to create a confidential rela-
tionship.177 Courts typically hold that companies that have few guards,
unlocked doors, unlocked files, and that do not require passes to enter con-
fidential areas have inadequately guarded the trade secret. 78 In early trade
secret cases, secrecy was often the determining factor in deciding if the in-
formation was a trade secret. 179 In the area of trade secret law today, how-
ever, courts are focusing more on the generally known and easily ascertain-
able aspects of trade secret law.'
80
C. Trade Secret Jurisprudence in Arkansas
This section of the note will examine the history of trade secret law in
Arkansas by discussing the evolution of trade secret jurisprudence from
reliance on the common law through adoption of the UTSA. In addition,
this part examines the recent decisions from the Arkansas Supreme Court
where the court has reversed precedent and relied upon the Restatement
factors in analyzing trade secret cases.
1. Arkansas Common Law of Trade Secret Protection Prior to the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The early Arkansas decisions involving trade secrets mainly discussed
the policy concerns in restricting trade.' 8' The court reasoned that legitimate
competition should be encouraged and that any restrictions placed on free
competition are not highly favored. 82 The court did recognize that in some
instances the use of trade secrets in a competing business would be subject
to an injunction if the employee obtained the trade secrets while working
there and then used that information to compete in the same business.
83
Even though the Restatement was available to the court in these early cases
to determine if a trade secret existed, the court simply stated that trade se-
176. Id. at 680,30 S.W.3d at 731.
177. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983).
178. See, e.g., Capsonic Group Inc. v. Plas-Met Corp., 361 N.E.2d 41, 44 (I11. App. Ct.
1977) (finding no guards present, unlocked doors, and no passes required to enter the plant).
179. See supra Part IIl.B.3.c.
180. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
181. See Miller v. Fairfield Bay, Inc., 247 Ark. 565, 572, 446 S.W.2d 660, 664 (1969);
Witmer v. Ark. Dailies, Inc., 202 Ark. 470, 476, 151 S.W.2d 971, 974 (1941).
182. Witmer, 202 Ark. at 476, 151 S.W.2d at 974.
183. Id., 151 S.W.2d at 974.
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crets were not involved, without any analysis, and chose instead to focus on
the covenants not to compete. 1
84
Later, in Miller v. Fairfield Bay, Inc., 85 the court noted that trade se-
crets were not involved in the case, and rather than relying on the Restate-
ment, the court, in a footnote, took the definition of trade secret from a dic-
tionary. 186 Four years later, in Rector-Phillips Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 87 the
court quoted the footnote definition provided in the Miller decision.'8 8 The
Arkansas Supreme Court would not rely on the Restatement for guidance in
trade secret cases until 1999.189
2. Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Arkansas adopted the majority of the text from the UTSA,' 90 and on
March 12, 1981, the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act (ATSA) became effec-
tive.'91 The ATSA includes the same definition for trade secret as the
UTSA.
192
Eleven years after the General Assembly enacted the ATSA, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of it in Allen v. Johar, Inc.
19 3
In Allen, once again, the court did not call upon the Restatement factors to
help determine whether a trade secret existed, but only interpreted and ap-
plied the ATSA.194 Allen filed suit against a former employee seeking to
184. Compare Miller, 247 Ark. at 571, 446 S.W.2d at 663 (stating, "[c]ertainly, there
were no trade secrets involved .... "), with Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Murrell, 212 Ark.
449, 457, 206 S.W.2d 185, 189 (1947) (stating trade secrets were involved but not using the
Restatement definition or the Restatement factors).
185. 247 Ark. at 565,446 S.W.2d at 660.
186. Id. at 570 n.4, 446 S.W.2d at 663 n.4 ("According to the American Heritage Dic-
tionary of the English Language (1969), a 'trade secret' is: 'A secret formula, method, or
device that gives one an advantage over competitors."').
187. 253 Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d 1 (1973).
188. Id. at 751, 489 S.W.2d at 3.
189. See Saforo & Assocs., Inc. v. Porocel Corp., 337 Ark. 553, 559, 991 S.W.2d 117,
120 (1999); see also infra Part 11.C.3.
190. Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1995), 14 U.L.A. 433-67
(1990), with ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (LEXIS Repl. 2001) (omitting several
UTSA sections from the ATSA including section 8 "Uniformity of Application and Con-
struction," section 9 "Short Title," section 10 "Severability," section 1 "Time of Taking
Effect," and section 12 "Repeal"); see also Frank J. Bozzo, Can You Keep a Secret? A
Primer on the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act, 1997 ARK. L. NOTEs 103 (discussing all the sec-
tions of the ATSA).
191. Act of Mar. 12, 1981, No. 439, 1981 Ark. Acts 439 (codified as ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-75-601 to -607).
192. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(4)(A)--(B); see supra Part II1.B.2 (detailing the
UTSA's definition).
193. 308 Ark. 45, 823 S.W.2d 824 (1992).
194. Id. at 47, 823 S.W.2d at 825.
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enjoin his use of an alleged confidential customer list and grinding ma-
chine. 95 Allen's grinding machine was the combination of two regular
grinding machines intermingled in a way that allowed Allen to produce two
handgrips simultaneously.' 96 This dual capacity machine was a huge com-
petitive advantage because other machines in the market were only able to
produce one grip at a time; therefore, Allen doubled his capacity.'97 The
court concluded that the machine was a trade secret because the evidence
supported the requirements needed under the ATSA; in particular, the court
noted the secrecy factor, relying on the fact that Allen did not allow tours of
the plant. 198 The court made this conclusion without analyzing any of the
other factors under the ATSA.' 99
The court then turned to the issue of Allen's customer list and found
that the list was a trade secret under the statute.2 °° The court concluded that
Allen had taken a substantial amount of time to develop the list.20' Again,
the court looked at the secrecy involved in protecting the list.20 2 Allen kept
the list confidential by not allowing it to leave the plant.2 °3 The court, there-
fore, held that trade secret protection existed for the customer list.
20 4
Several years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Cardinal Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. ,205 quoted and applied
the ATSA, and once again chose not to utilize the Restatement factors.20 6
The court held that the price modeling, profit margins, future plans, and
market strategies were trade secrets under the ATSA.2°7 The court con-
cluded that the information was not generally known or readily ascertain-
able and that the confidential agreement and "loose-lips" policy provided
adequate secrecy to insure protection of the trade secret.208 During all of this
time, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not look to the Restatement for guid-
ance in trade secret cases. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court diverged
from this path in 1999.209
195. Id. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825.
196. Id. at 47-48, 823 S.W.2d at 825-26.
197. Id. at 48, 823 S.W.2d at 826.
198. Id. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826.
199. See Allen, 308 Ark. at 47-49, 823 S.W.2d at 825-26.
200. Id. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
201. Id. at 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 826-27.
202. Id. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
203. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 827.
204. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 827.
205. 336 Ark 143, 987 S.W.2d 642 (1999).
206. See id. at 147-48, 987 S.W.2d at 644.
207. Id. at 151, 987 S.W.2d at 646.
208. Id., 987 S.W.2d at 646; see supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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3. Arkansas Supreme Court Adopts the Restatement Factors as
Guidance for Determination of Whether a Trade Secret Exists
Only four months after deciding Cardinal Freight Carriers, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court, in Saforo & Associates, Inc. v. Porocel Corp.,2 10 took a
different approach in analyzing trade secret cases in Arkansas by adopting
the "Vigoro factors as the controlling analysis for determining whether any
particular information constitutes a trade secret., 21  The court made a pass-
ing quote of the ATSA and then went directly into analyzing each of the six
Restatement factors against the facts of the case. 212 In Saforo, Porocel
sought to enjoin Saforo from using a wash water system that it had devel-
oped.213 Porocel alleged that it had developed a special system to wash
Bayer Scale, an alumina residue, which Saforo used in its business. 214 Sa-
foro later terminated the contract that it had with Porocel and helped a com-
petitor build a wash water system similar to Porocel's. 21 '5 After hearing evi-
dence from experts in the field that the system was unique and the evidence
presented from Porocel concerning their secrecy of the wash water system,
the court concluded that the wash water system met all six Restatement fac-
tors and was a protectable trade secret.
216
One year later, in ConAgra, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 217 the Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that the six Restatement factors were essentially
218the same as the ATSA requirements. 2 8 The court listed the six Restatement
factors and quoted the ATSA, but noted that secrecy was the "ultimate deci-
sion regarding whether the information is in fact a trade secret.' 219 The
court found that ConAgra had not taken reasonable steps to maintain the
secrecy of its pricing programs, profit margins, and marketing strategy and,
therefore, denied trade secret protection.220 The court reasoned that if the
owner of the alleged trade secret did not take reasonable steps to protect the
210. 337 Ark. 553, 991 S.W.2d 117 (1999).
211. Id. at 559, 991 S.W.2d at 120. The "Vigoro factors" were allegedly the Restatement
factors that were used in that case. See Brandon B. Cate, Note, Saforo & Associates, Inc. v.
Porocel Corp.: The Failure of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act To Clarify the Doubtful and
Confused Status of Common Law Trade Secret Principles, 53 ARK. L. REv. 687, 691 (2000).
The Vigoro case, however, does not mention or apply the Restatement factors. Vigoro Indus.,
Inc. v. Cleveland Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1160-63 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
212. Saforo, 337 Ark. at 559-62, 991 S.W.2d at 120-22.
213. Id. at 557, 991 S.W.2d at 119.
214. Id.,991 S.W.2dat 119.
215. Id.,991 S.W.2dat 119.
216. Id. at 559-62, 991 S.W.2d at 120-21.
217. 342 Ark. 672, 30 S.W.3d 725 (2000).
218. Id. at 676-78, 30 S.W.3d at 728.
219. Id. at 676-78, 680, 30 S.W.3d at 731.
220. Id. at 679-80, 30 S.W.3d at 730.
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secrecy, then the information becomes easily ascertainable or generally
known and, thus, is not protectable under trade secret law.221
In the past few years, the Arkansas Supreme Court has come into line
with other jurisdictions across the country by relying on the Restatement for
guidance in trade secret law.222 Even though Arkansas is now consistent
with the majority of jurisdictions, many scholars feel that if an individual
state has enacted some form of the UTSA then reliance on the Restatement
factors is no longer needed.223 The uncertainty in how courts rely on each of
the six factors and the inconsistent holdings in cases involving analysis un-
der the Restatement factors has left scholars, judges, and businesspeople in a
state of confusion as to what requirements are necessary to gain trade secret
protection.224
IV. REASONING
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Market, Inc., 225 the Arkansas Supreme
Court broke from precedent and held that trade secrets must meet all the
requirements of the ATSA as well as the six Restatement factors to qualify
for trade secret protection.226 Even after stating the Restatement factors were
part of the analysis, the Arkansas Supreme Court only relied on the ATSA
in finding that the bulk purchase financing plan proposed by P.O. Market
was not a trade secret because it was generally known in the industry and
easily ascertainable by proper means.227
A. Information Requirement
The first consideration the court made was whether the bulk purchase
financing plan that O'Banion proposed was "information" under the stat-
ute.228 The court noted the general principle that if the alleged trade secret is
221. See id. at 680, 30 S.W.3d at 731.
222. See supra Part III.C.3.
223. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also infra note 263 and accompany-
ing text.
224. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also infra note 263 and accompany-
ing text.
225. 347 Ark. 651, 66 S.W.3d 620 (2002).
226. Id. at 667, 66 S.W.3d at 630.
227. Id. at 673, 66 S.W.3d at 635.
228. Id. at 667, 66 S.W.3d at 630. The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that other jurisdic-
tions agree with the conclusion that it is a legal question whether or not certain information is
a protectable trade secret. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 630. The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that it
had examined this element before in three prior cases and that it had either "directly or by
inference" decided whether certain information qualified under the statute. Id., 66 S.W.3d at
630; see Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., 336 Ark. 143, 151, 987 S.W.2d
642, 646 (1999) (holding that profit margins, pricing models, software, and future marketing
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not specifically stated or defined, then no trade secret protection can ex-
ist.aa9 The court cited several cases in which failure to specifically define the
proposed trade secret was fatal to the cause of action.2 30 The court expressed
concerns about whether the O'Banion concept was specifically defined.23'
The court found that the O'Banion concept evolved and was in constant flux
from the time of its conception up until the last contact between O'Banion
and Austin.2 32 The court, on two occasions, noted that it had concerns about
the definiteness of the O'Banion concept, but chose not to decide the case
on this basis.233 Instead, the court focused on and ultimately decided the
case on the generally known and easily ascertainable factors of the
ATSA.234
B. Generally Known and Easily Ascertainable
The Arkansas Supreme Court primarily focused on whether there was
substantial evidence that the O'Banion concept had economic benefit from
not being generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means. 235 The
analysis at this point developed into the theory of whether the financing
plan, as a whole, was a trade secret even though the plan consisted of eco-
nomic elements known in the industry. 236 P.O. Market alleged that the
O'Banion concept took those known elements and combined them in a
unique pattern that subjected the whole concept to trade secret protection.
237
The court noted that combination trade secrets could fall under the protec-
tive veil of trade secret law, even though those in the industry may know of
the components, so long as the whole of the thing is new or unique.238 Rely-
ing on its earlier decision in Saforo, as well as other jurisdictions, the court
noted that combination components can become protectable trade secrets.239
plans were all combination trade secrets); Allen v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark. 45, 50, 823 S.W.2d
824, 827 (1992) (holding that customer lists that took twenty years to develop were combina-
tion trade secrets).
229. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 669, 66 S.W.3d at 631.
230. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 631 (citing Coenco, Inc. v. Coenco Sales, Inc., 940 F.2d 1176 (8th
Cir. 1991); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983)).
231. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632.
232. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632. O'Banion changed the trademark and license aspects of the
agreement. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632. The geographical area the plan was to service also
changed. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632.
233. Id. at 669, 673, 66 S.W.3d at 632, 634.
234. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632.
235. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 669, 66 S.W.3d at 632.
236. Id. at 670, 66 S.W.3d at 632.
237. Id. at 669-70, 66 S.W.3d at 632.
238. Id. at 670, 66 S.W.3d at 632.
239. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632 (citing Integrated Cash Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Digital Transac-
tions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990); Lee v. Cercoa, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. Dist.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that being the first to use certain proc-
esses did not in and of itself warrant trade secret protection when those in
the field already knew of the individual components.24 °
O'Banion himself testified that the components of his system were
known economic principles.241 He testified that "there was nothing secret
about [the individual parts of the plan]. 242 O'Banion contended that he
turned the parts into a problem solving solution and that it was a trade secret
at that point.243 The ultimate issue before the court was whether the
O'Banion concept was unique rather than merely a variation of other known
economic principles.244
The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that it was obvious that "any per-
son reasonably well versed in the economics of wholesaling and credit pur-
chasing could have put together the O'Banion concept., 245 The court deter-
mined that at its most basic level the O'Banion concept was essentially just
wholesaling, buying goods at favorable prices and selling them to customers
at a slightly higher price.246 The court did point out that the test was not
whether each of the individual components in the overall plan were gener-
ally known, but whether the plan as a whole was generally known or easily
ascertainable by proper means.247 Even looking at the whole financing plan,
248the court concluded that the O'Banion concept was not unique. The court
held that there was nothing in the O'Banion plan that was not already gen-
erally known or easily ascertainable in the industry. 249 To further support
this conclusion, the court recited the testimony of O'Banion in which he
stated that the idea of the O'Banion concept came from Dan DeLaughter,
admittedly in a smaller form, but generally the same plan.250 The Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded from this testimony that the O'Banion concept
was in use in certain business circles, and therefore, it was generally known
or easily ascertainable.2
Ct. App. 1983); Weston v. Buckley, 677 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. App. 1997); Electro-Craft Corp.
v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983)).
240. Id. at 671, 66 S.W.3d at 633 (citing TGC Corp. v. HTM Sports, B.V., 896 F. Supp.
751 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (stating that being the first to use an idea in the general domain is not
enough to warrant trade secret protection when the components are all known in the field)).
241. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 670, 66 S.W.3d at 632.
242. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632.
243. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 632-33.
244. Id. at 671, 66 S.W.3d at 633.
245. Id. at 672, 66 S.W.3d at 634.
246. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 634.
247. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 672, 66 S.W.3d at 634.
248. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 634.
249. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 634.
250. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 634.
251. Id. at 672-73, 66 S.W.3d at 634.
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O'Banion attempted to distinguish his idea as novel through witness
testimony.252 Bill McBrine stated that the components of the O'Banion con-
cept were generally known in the industry, but Sam's Club had not imple-
mented any financing systems prior to the meetings with O'Banion.253
McBrine testified that O'Banion's concept was "exciting, novel, a unique
product, and worth a lot of money. 254 Furthermore, O'Banion and Hoffman
both testified about the uniqueness of the plan.255 However, the court gave
"little credence" to this testimony.256 The court held "that the testimony of
these three men does not rise to the level of evidence of such sufficient
force and character to compel a conclusion on this point with reasonable
certainty. '257
Because the information was either already generally known in the in-
dustry or easily ascertainable by proper means, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed the jury's decision and held that the O'Banion concept did not
qualify as a combination trade secret under the ATSA or the Restatement
factors.258
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart is important in
two aspects, both of which could affect future trade secret cases in Arkan-
sas. First, the Arkansas Supreme Court contravened the intent of the Gen-
eral Assembly and heightened the requirements for future trade secret cases
in Arkansas-after Wal-Mart, trade secrets must meet both the ATSA defi-
nition of trade secret and all of the Restatement factors to qualify for trade
secret protection. Second, in changing the requirements for trade secret pro-
tection in Arkansas, the court diverged from the main premise behind trade
secret law, allowing lazy competitors to gain a competitive advantage by
misappropriating trade secrets.
The Arkansas General Assembly sought to clarify the area of trade se-
cret law by deviating from the common law principles and enacting the
ATSA.259 The intent of the ATSA was to provide for broader protection of
252. Id. at 673, 66 S.W.3d at 634.
253. Wal-Mart, 347 Ark. at 673, 66 S.W.3d at 634.
254. Id. at 663, 66 S.W.3d at 627.
255. Id. at 673, 66 S.W.3d at 634.
256. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 634.
257. Id., 66 S.W.3d at 634 (stating "[tihe fact that they testified similarly at trial was
simply self-serving and a restatement of their theory of the case").
258. Id. at 654, 673, 66 S.W.3d at 621, 635.
259. Act of Mar. 12, 1981, No. 439, 1981 Ark. Acts 439 (codified as ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-75-601 to 607 (LEXIS Repl. 2001)) ("Because of the uncertainty with regard to a sub-
stantial number of patents and because of the commercial importance of trade secrets law to
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trade secrets while clarifying the confused status of trade secret law.2 60 The
Arkansas Supreme Court, by limiting trade secret protection to only trade
secrets that meet the ATSA definition and all six Restatement factors, cir-
cumvented the intent of the General Assembly and confused the already
difficult area of trade secret law in Arkansas.
The Arkansas Supreme Court not only deviated from legislative intent,
but also went beyond modem trade secret jurisprudence by requiring that all
six Restatement factors must be met to qualify for trade secret protection.
While other jurisdictions do rely on the six Restatement factors for guid-
ance, they do not require that a trade secret meet all six of the factors to
obtain trade secret protection.26' The commentators of the Restatement did
not intend for courts to use the six factors as a list of qualifications; the fac-
tors should serve as guideposts. 262 Moreover, some commentators believe
that reliance on the Restatement factors is redundant, not to mention out-
dated, once a state adopts some form of the UTSA, suggesting that the
UTSA preempts other causes of action for trade secrets.263 Therefore, be-
cause Arkansas adopted a form of the UTSA, complete reliance on the Re-
statement factors may be misplaced. 264 Arkansas courts should instead only
use the Restatement factors as a guide in analyzing trade secret cases, not as
a conclusive list of requirements. Not only has the Arkansas Supreme Court
deviated from legislative intent by requiring all six Restatement factors in
addition to the ATSA requirements, but also now requires courts in Arkan-
sas to use a test that is at best confusing.265
It is clear from the two recent cases that followed Wal-Mart, Weigh
Systems South, Inc., v. Mark's Scales & Equipment, Inc. 266 and Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc.,267 that the Arkansas Supreme Court views the
six factors as the exclusive checklist to decide whether information is a
trade secret.268 In both of these cases, the court analyzed the facts of the case
industry in the State of Arkansas, it is necessary to have the doubtful and confused status of
the common law and statutory remedies for trade secrets clarified ....
260. See supra notes 136-37, 259 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
262. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 757 cmt. b.
263. Cavico, supra note 104, at 17.
264. Id.
265. See supra note 132 (explaining that the original Restatement definition was not
included in the updated version of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; instead, the area of
trade secret law, including a new definition of trade secret, was included in the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition).
266. 347 Ark. 868, 68 S.W.3d 299 (2002).
267. 349 Ark. 469, 79 S.W.3d 326 (2002); see supra Part 111.C.3 (discussing the first
ConAgra case).




directly against the six Restatement factors.269 The court, in each case, did
not analyze the ATSA; it only mentioned the ATSA in passing.27" These
recent decisions have to leave the General Assembly wondering whether
passing the ATSA had any meaning to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The second significant point from Wal-Mart is the appearance that Ar-
kansas courts, like courts around the country, are stepping back from the
general principle behind trade secret law, which is to prevent the improper
taking of an idea.27' Courts focus instead on whether or not the idea itself
was a trade secret, regardless of how improper the taking. The law origi-
nally protected items that would be costly or take a long time to develop.
272
Courts also looked at the difficulty the person would have had in developing
the trade secret had he not used improper means.273 Courts now concentrate
more on the generally known aspect of trade secret cases.274 While courts
disagree on what exactly this term means, the term "generally known" ap-
pears to operate on somewhat of a continuum.275 Some courts interpret
"generally known" to mean the majority of people in the industry already
have the knowledge; therefore, it cannot be a trade secret.276 Other courts
find that if the information affords some level of competitive advantage,
even over a single competitor, then it is not "generally known" and can be a
protected trade secret.277 If courts take the broad definition of "generally
known" they are in reality giving businesses less of an incentive to invent or
create new information.278 The incentive to invent decreases when the in-
formation is very costly to develop or will take a tremendous amount of
work and effort, just to have it misappropriated by a competitor. If courts
take the narrow approach, however, competition could be stifled. Every new
idea that a company has would be subject to trade secret protection and
would cause restraints on the competitive atmosphere of the market system.
The third and most restrictive meaning of "generally known" is the ob-
viousness test.279 Courts using this definition of "generally known" deter-
269. See Tyson, 349 Ark. at 479-83, 79 S.W.3d at 331-34; Weigh Sys., 347 Ark. at 875-78,
68 S.W.3d at 302-04.
270. See Tyson, 349 Ark. at 479-83, 79 S.W.3d at 331-34; Weigh Sys., 347 Ark. at 875-78,
68 S.W.3d at 302-04.
271. Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secrete Gap: Protecting "Confidential Infor-
mation" Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 845 (1998).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
275. Unikel, supra note 271, at 845.
276. Id. at 870.
277. Id. at 870, 875 (suggesting that the "not generally known" requirement should in-
clude only information "that is known to a minority (i.e., less than half) of persons who could
obtain economic or competitive value from its use").
278. See id. at 875-76.
279. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
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mine that if a person could have developed the idea using proper means,
then no trade secret protection exists, regardless of the time and expense
they saved by misappropriating the idea.280 In Wal-Mart, the court used the
most restrictive definition of "generally known" by declaring that it was
obvious that anyone could have developed the O'Banion concept.28' One
commentator stated that it is irrational to deny protection "simply because
[the] actor theoretically could have obtained the knowledge through proper
means."282 The whole premise underlying trade secret law is that if the per-
son can acquire the information properly, then he should do so properly.283
Trade secret law today is placing too much emphasis on the possibility of
the actor developing the trade secret on his own, instead of realizing that the
actor saved time, money, effort, and man-power by gaining the information
from others who already put their blood, sweat, and tears into the develop-
ment of the information. Furthermore, this idea should apply not only to
time intensive projects, but also to those that were easy to develop.284 One
commentator believes that the easier it is to obtain the information, the more
forceful courts should be on punishing the improper taking. 285 This implies
that the lazier the business is in developing some relatively simple idea, the
worse they appear in the world of fair competition.286 Therefore, if Wal-
Mart did obtain the information from the four meetings and various propos-
als that O'Banion supplied, it truly was a lazy competitor, especially since
the individual components of the overall plan were available in the industry.
The holding from Wal-Mart may cause a chilling effect on businesses
in Arkansas while at the same time rewarding lazy companies that use un-
fair tactics in competition. By using the terms "generally known" and "eas-
ily ascertainable" as a premise that anyone could have developed the infor-
mation, the Arkansas Supreme Court has made it difficult for courts in Ar-
kansas to ever find that a combination trade secret exists. There is always
the possibility that someone could have developed the information by
proper means, especially since the components are all in the public domain.
Therefore, businesses in Arkansas are going to be leery of spending the time
and money to develop combination trade secrets in light of this new test. It
appears that the Supreme Court of Arkansas has stepped away from the
280. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text. It appears that courts are taking a
patent approach to trade secrets by using the obviousness test. The use of a patent-like test is
clearly against the main premise behind trade secret jurisprudence. See supra notes 110-13
and accompanying text.
281. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Mkt., Inc., 347 Ark. 651, 672, 66 S.W.3d 620, 634
(2002).
282. Unikel, supra note 271, at 876; see also supra note 112.
283. Unikel, supra note 271, at 876.





origins of trade secret law and is now helping lazy competitors gain a com-
petitive advantage over the innovator.
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